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JURISPRUDENCE ON PARADE

Hessel E. Yntema*

J

URISPRUDENCE is part of the pageant that makes history. This
is a truism that, it may be added, obtains irrespective of the view
held as to the significance of general legal theory. To some, the constructs of jurisprudence may seem but laggard symbols of more vital
facts and trends. The degree of the lag exhibited by the more celebrated of such constructs may suggest to an anthropologically-minded
observer, such as Thurman Arnold, that the apparent function of jurisprudence in the present social climate is neither to represent reality nor
to control the administration of justice, but rather by the magic of ritual
to lend to the pageant the promise of paradise human beings still desire
of the law that they may be reconciled to the uncertainty, confusion,
injustice, and frustration of actual life. On the other hand, those of
idealistic bent will, with Holmes, conceive theory as the significant part
of law; for these, ideas set the tunes to which the pageant marches.
Some of these, perhaps a Kelsen or a Morris R. Cohen, will insist the
tunes derive from astral postulates of a metahistorical order, postulates
beyond the contingencies of time and space and mysteriously therefore
of ultimate significance to the physical world to which law applies.
Even on this esoteric view, it is apparent that the categories of jurisprudence are part of their times.
Of this relation, the recent progress of juristic theories in the
United States affords interesting illustration. In the glamorous Twenties, for example, American jurisprudence imbibed animated assurance
from the current optimism. The jural air was rife with seminal ideas.
Sociological jurisprudence pervaded the legal world, a gospel that
promised constructive, if measured, progress and bestowed its contagious benediction upon a veritable ferment of reform. "Law in
action," functional, pragmatic, institutional, and behavioristic approaches to the problems of law, the discovery of scientific method,
cooperation with other social sciences, and corresponding emphasis
upon legal research-such aspirations formed the heady brew that then
served to enliven the sphere of legal discourse and to enlarge its traditional horizons. Under the stimulus, novel methods of legal instruction were envisioned, graduate training in law was extended to new
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areas, and even the long-established undergraduate curriculum, which
in I 920 appeared as impermeable to innovation as once did the mediaeval trivium, was earnestly analyzed and in significant quarters succumbed to incipient reform. In the melioristic enthusiasm, subjects
somewhat apart from the main streams of interest also profited: there
was a modest revival of legal history and comparative law, as well as
of legal theory, while a select cult of legal analysis concerned itself
with such matters as Hohfeld's scheme of fundamental legal conceptions. Meanwhile, there was organized effort to improve the practical
administration of justice. The Cleveland Crime Survey inaugurated an
epidemic of corresponding factualistic studies, culminating in the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, that promised
to reveal the causes of crime as well as the defects in the judicial system. To streamline this system, admittedly antiquated, judicial councils were organized in a majority of the jurisdictions in the country. An
imposing organization of the leadership of the bar and legal scholarship, the American Law Institute, was established to prepare a code
greater than that of Justinian, the Restatement of the Law, designed,
through authoritative formulation of the existing principles of the
Common Law, to clarify the confusion and to relieve the burden of
the enormous system of precedents, under which the bar had intermittently groaned for more than a century. To foster the new directions
of legal inquiry and reform, new schools and institutes were founded,
and notable benefactions to existing institutions were made to augment,
house, and supply the expanding needs of legal education and research.
These monuments celebrated and sought to perpetuate the hopes of
the renaissance of jurisprudence in the Twenties.
Came the dolorous Thirties, and what had for a time seemed a
temporary recession in business conditions deepened into the great
depression. Promising projects were deferred, and enterprises of some
hope in legal education and reform had to be reduced in scope or
abandoned. Moreover, it became apparent that, in certain respects, the
optimistic anticipations of the Twenties were, if not vain, at least difficult of achievement. It could be observed that the chief product of
intensive effort to reform the legal curriculum was a new series of
casebooks that but modestly represented the expanded area of legal
science; that, despite extensive surveys of law administration and enforcement, the judicial system still creaked along under an accumulating burden of litigation, under conditions relatively unmodified; that
the most monumental accomplishment of the new legal science, the
Restatement of the Law, though still in process, gave little evidence
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that it could clarify or stem the muddy multiplicity of the laws. If
such interruptions and disillusionments were calculated to lend a cautious accent in the evolution of legal ideas, their pessimistic impact was
relatively insignificant as contrasted with that of the social problems,
rendered acute and conscious by the depression, that sprang from the
soil from every quarter and in every land-problems epitomized in the
United States in the New Deal philosophy that substituted the thesis
of emergency for the myth of "normalcy" to launch with urgent courage a vast variety of social and administrative experimentation. Mean. while, in the world at large, analogous pressures generated political
movements and attitudes that degraded international relations in the
name of _reasons of state, and a tragic trend to resolve the pressures by
ultimate recourse to war became progressively evident.
Such conditions necessarily had a profound, if impalpable, effect
upon jurisprudence. Inevitably, its progress became less eager, more
hesitant, as the rosy promise of the Twenties merged into the shadows
of the valley of the depression, where hopes and fears, moral purpose
and cynical activism, were embattled in confused melee, and as energy
that might have gone into the development of legal science under
normal conditions was diverted into the maelstrom of necessitous
reform and administrative office. In the juristic world as such, two
characteristic reactions to the situation appeared, which may be described, respectively, as a relapse to realism and a recession from
reality. The first reaction, not without its antecedents, was definitely
indicated in 1930 by two publications that have been commonly taken
as inaugurating American legal realism, as the movement is somewhat ineptly termed. The first was a brilliant article in which Llewellyn proclaimed a realistic jurisprudence as the next step 1 and the
second, Frank's Law and the Modern Mind, a work that must be
deemed, in view of the attention it received, one of the significant
contributions to American legal thinking during the past decade. The
critical attack upon rationalistic traditionalism, the subordination of
legal doctrine to social reality, the emphasis upon the relativity and
" uncertainty of law as actually administered, the call to a more sophisticated and experimental attitude to legal problems, announced in these
and succeeding contributions to the realistic movement, challenged
the complacency with which conventional jurisprudence had been conducting its vocation.
The challenge precipitated the second reaction to which reference
1

"A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Step," 30 CoL. L. REv. 431 (1930).
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has been made above, the recession from reality. Appropriately and in
short order, a counterattack: emanated from the headquarters of the
recognized schools of legal philosophy. None has juster cause to be
jealous of a pretender than the king who sits upon the throne. The
acknowledged leader of sociological jurisprudence, Roscoe Pound,
recognizing the advent of a new juristic school, launched a most subtle
argument to envelop its positions; recalling that various legal philosophies had failed to rationalize law in terms of an absolute reality or
significance, he proposed that the new emphasis (in which indeed there
was nothing new) was but one of the points of view to be taken into
account in an adequate theory of law. To substantiate this argument, it
was of course necessary to accentuate the traditional and idealistic
aspects of law that realism was proposing to deemphasize, to stress
''Received ideals, conceptions, the quest for certainty and uniformity,
an authoritative technique of using authoritative legal materials, settled
legal doctrines and modes of thought, and a traditional mode of legal
reasoning," 2 as actual and therefore significant phenomena of the legal
order. Simultaneously, Morris R. Cohen, a philosopher distinguished
as the leading exponent of scientific and logical methods in law, more
directly charged the new movement with the alleged sins of nominalism and suppression of the basic normative constitution of law.8
If the first of these counts, however true, may seem quite irrelevant
to any but professional epistemologists, the second reinforced Pound's
insistence upon the significance of the ideal postulates of juristic theory.
It is not necessary to consider the merits of these arguments to discern
that both made toleration the basis of attack; "But in the house of
jurisprudence there are many mansions," said Pound, while, not without a certain pathos, Cohen responded, "My own program may be a
puny one but it has a right to live." 4 Under the conditions on which
issue was joined, this effort to maintain the status quo in the house of
jurisprudence involved a recession from reality in the direction of
Platonism. This trend, it may be added, apparently inspired a neoscholastic development at the University of Chicago, devoted to the
exposition and study of "the principles and rules which constitute the
law."
2 Pound, "The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence," 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 at
699 (1931).
8
M. R. Cohen, "Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law," 31 CoL. L. REv.
352 (1931).
4
Pound, "The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence," 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 at 711
(1931); M. R. Cohen, "Philosophy and Legal Science," 32 CoL. L. REV. 1103 at
II 18 (1932).
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Though it is not pertinent to this occasion to review the further
evolution of this interesting discussion, reference should be made to a
third and highly original reaction to the realist program, formulated
by Thurman Arnold in two acute, if somewhat discursive, works, The
Symbols of· Government and The Folklore of Capitalism, published
respectively in 1935 and 1937. Discarding the effort of the realists to
reconcile the legal and economic theories upon which society thinks
it operates with its practices, the anthropological analysis projected in
these works assumes that such theories form an integral part of the
phenomena to be studied by social science. In effect, the argument presented is that, while fundamental principles are essential to the maintenance of human institutions in an environment that needs rational
symbolisms to justify what is, such principles to serve the purpose must
admit of the dramatization of so many conflicting ideals-the "little
pictures" that society interposes between itself and the real worldthat "no systematic set of doctrines can ever be used as either explanations or predictions concerning the habits of an institution." 5 Accordingly, jurisprudence was characterized as a species of folklore or ceremonial ritual. Curiously enough, the conclusion was, without intent,
corroborated by its critics; among other things, they suggested that, by
reducing indiscriminatingly all social theories to folklore, the analysis
placed itself in that category and therefore taxed Arnold for failure to
set forth a persuasive theory of social objectives. This substantiated the
major premise that at present the social need in law and economics is
for folklore rather than scientific observation.
These incomplete preliminary observations may serve to set the
stage for a necessarily cursory review of certain recent contributions to
the American pageant of jurisprudence. These include three series of
lectures, two studies of the philosophy of legal realism, a popular
representation of an intriguing Swedish theory of law, a projected
sociology of law, and an instructive analysis of the theory of legal
scrence.
I. The Polemic Against Legal Realism
It is appropriate first to consider the contribution of the first American jurist, the recent series of lectures on contemporary juristic theory
by Roscoe Pound. 6 As contrasted with the magistral and eminently
judicious survey of American juristic thinking in the twentieth century
5 ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GoVERNMENT 10 (1935).
6 CoNTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY. By Roscoe Pound.
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published but a few months before by the same eminent scholar,7 the
present lectures can only be described as a macabre joust with the
philosophy of legal realism in an atmosphere of consummate tragedy.
Here is one, appalled at the spread of political absolutism, who attributes the portentous wave of increased regimentation by discretionary
administrative processes to give-it-up philosophies of legal realism that
deny the essential "oughtness" of law, who fully perceives the psychological, logical, and historical justification of these philosophies and
reluctantly admits that idealistic legal philosophy has begged the
question as to what ought to be, who is constrained to confess that the
successive doctrines as to the ends of law give not so much a measure
for resolving the essential problem of law, the valuing of interests, as
a starting point for reasoning and the application of standards, and who
therefore is driven to found his inexpugnable hope of an ideal philosophy in the experience to which the realists themselves appeal and its
content in the traditional practices of the legal profession. To the
amazement of the reader, the argument concludes with the admission
that the ideals, the authoritative pictures of the social order, in accordance with which justice is now being administered do not comport with
the present needs of society, or, in the words of the concluding paragraph, that
"It is bad social engineering to administer justice to a blue
print of a society of the past as a means of maintaining the jural
postulates of civilization in a different society of the p'resent." 8
It is as if King Canute, even while defying the waves of the sea, to
approach the royal throne, should suddenly realize that his feet are
getting wet. For the concluding admission destroys the validity of the
last sanctuary in the argument to preserve the authority of law on some
rational ground other than brute force.
It would be presumptuous and not without peril of misstatement to
summarize the rich allusion and suggestive analogy with which the
theme that a constructive legal philosophy is needed to avert the wave
of absolutism is embroidered. It may, however, be useful to refer to
certain points in the argument that do not carry complete conviction, if
only to refer them to the judgment of the interested reader. The first
1 "American Juristic Thinking in the Twentieth Century," A CENTURY OF
SocxAL THOUGHT 143 (1939).
8 PouND, CONTEMPORARY JuRxsnc THEORY 83 (1940).
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refers to the thesis developed in these lectures that legal realism is the
intellectual twin of political absolutism, a supposition which appears
open to question on several counts. In the first place, the character
attributed to realism is a caricature; we read for example:
"The juristic absolutism, which is so widespread today as a
reinforcement of administrative absolutism, assumes, it presupposes, that in the nature of things it is psychologically impossible
for the judicial process to operate objectively and impartially.
Hence, the apparatus of principles and rules ... by which for centuries men have sought to constrain the process to operate uniformly and predictably and objectively is futile. Its supposed
achievement of that purpose is a delusion. Our faith in it is superstition. Behind the supposed principles and rules and conceptions, the
true moving forces of decision are operating independently. It is
not scientific to take account of more than the individual decision
itself. Thus it follows that what is done in the course of judicial
decision is law because it is done, not done because it is law. The
attempt to hold down the individual judge to legally prescribed
paths of action is futile. Legislator, administrative official and
judge may as well be left free in theory to pursue their own
paths to the general good each in his own way, since in practice
they will do so in any event. If we think in this fashion, the way
out does seem to be a postulated all-wise leader with no limits
to his power."~
Now, despite such loose language as may occasionally have been
vented in the literature of legal realism, one who has stood somewhat
outside the realist position may note that, in this construction of its
philosophy, there are at least two vital assumptions that no realist need
admit. The first is that for realism there can be no classification of judicial
determinations; that each case is in all respects unique. This resurrects
the exploded supposition that, certain realists having adopted a nominalistic vocabulary, realism necessarily excludes the possibility and
usefulness of general conceptions denoting classes. Whether such conceptions be regarded as mental constructs, as the nominalists may suppose, or as Platonic essences, as the transcendentalists may urge, is not
significant in this connection. What the realists have pertinently
pointed out, however, is that frequently a legal situation may be classified under several such general conceptions, thus rendering it necessary
9

Id.

IO-II.
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to look beyond the preconceived conceptual scheme for a basis of d_etermination.10
The second exaggeration in the character attributed to legal realism
is that it assumes principles and rules to be without significance. Which
is in effect to say that, unless one agrees that principles and rules
themselves disclose their automatic effect in the judicial process, he
denies that they have any effect. If the realists really believed that
legal concepts have no significance, it would be difficult to understand
why they have been so concerned about their real significance. The
fact is that the realists, not unjustifiably supposing that general concepts may have little consequence apart from their specific connotations
and perceiving the eminent possibility that certain of the rules and
concepts may serve purposes other than appear on their surface, have
been particularly concerned to' ascertain the function and effects of the
conceptual apparatus in relation to other factors affecting the legal
order. That this inquiry has led them to deny to the conceptual apparatus sole or even primary significance in certain crucial types of
cases, to suggest that particular conventional legal formulations do not
adequately represent what is doing in the judicial process, is perhaps
the occasion for objection on the part of those who attribute unique
significance to the traditional, authoritative concepts. But the objection
is not supported by its mere assertion.
A second point to which attention may be directed is that the argument linking the advance of political absolutism to the prevalence of
pragmatic thinking in law glosses over a serious problem of historical
causation. Naturally, governmental organizations will generate or
adopt philosophies to justify their procedures. And, in an age when,
as the author persuasively indicates, philosophic realism is in the air,
such philosophies will probably be realistic. But to suppose that the
realistic hen is necessarily the cause of the political egg takes no account
of the possibility that philosophy and institutional practice may not
only react upon each other but more especially may have common relations to a far more intricate nexus of circumstances than the argument
remotely suggests. Moreover, it is pertinent to recall that, in at least
two epochs when political absolutism was waxing big, namely, the
classical period of Roman law and the early part of the seventeenth
century, natural law philosophies, philosophies that the significant law
is what ought-to-be, were in vogue. Indeed, the most thorough-going

°For a classic discussion of this problem, see Oliphant, "A Return to Stare Decisis," 14 A. B. A. J. 71, 159 (1928).
1
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projection of political absolutism in the English language was predicated by Thomas Hobbes upon the basis of natural law. This may
suggest not merely that the relation between realistic philosophy and
political absolutism is by no means necessary, but even that realism may
be ultimately less hospitable to despotism than a romantic idealism. For
realism inevitably points to the effects of governmental action that
idealism is satisfied to deplore.
The second lecture is devoted to the "give-it-up" philosophies,
which the author deprecates on the ground that they tend to eliminate
from law its vital element, the Ought. In an extremely instructive synthesis, the intellectual currents which have contributed to such philosophies are indicated-the growth of the idea of contingency in natural
science, the emphasis upon observational techniques in social science, the
influence of Marxian economic determinism, the undermining of the
basis of Kantian metaphysics by modern psychology, and the appearance
of Neo-Kantian logical relativism. In the face of the admission that
the Neo-Hegelian and other idealist philosophic systems apparently
postulate as given that which is to be proved as the end to direct the
processes of social control, it is difficult to appreciate why the realistic
position should therefore be impugned by the author. And it is still
more difficult to appreciate why such views should be prejudicially
tagged as "give-it-up" philosophies, in the face of the further fact
stressed by the author that the systematic process of social control by
politically organized society proceeds without as well as with philosophical direction. It would thus seem that the realists have given
up merely the effort to rationalize the process in terms of an abstract,
absolute petitio principii; there is no evidence that this abstention has
incapacitated them to participate in reform-if anything, the contrary.
The underlying difficulty in the argument at this point is the assumption
that realism really eliminates the ought from social and legal science,
a matter that may be conveniently discussed below.
The final lecture is addressed to the central problem of judicial
valuation, conceived as a process of social engineering which is to be
analyzed in terms of the inventory, classification, recognition, delimitation, and effectuation of interests. Here too the author finds the measure in historical legal experience:
"What then," he asks, "is the practical measure of values
which the law has been using where theories have failed it? Put
simply it has been and is to secure as much as possible of the scheme
of interests as a whole as may be with the least friction and waste;
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to secure as much of the whole inventory of interests as may be
with the least impairment of the inventory as a whole. No matter
what theories of the end of law have prevailed, this is what the
legal order has been doing, and as we look back we see has been
doing remarkably well." 11
This analysis of the judicial process as social engineering basically
effected by compromise, be it noted, approximates realism in the
author's sense. In accepting Ihering's concept of interests and in assuming as the basic measure of valuation the maximal protection of the
whole inventory of interests, the inherent significance and validity of
asserted claims and pressures is recognized essentially on the ground of
"is" instead of "ought." An observer, I believe it was Max Lerner,
once remarked the radical antinomy between this conception of law as
social engineering and the author's efforts to idealize law as an autonomous system of postulates. We too may wage a doubt whether even
his redoubtable competence to reconcile disparate ideas and, as Mr.
Dooley might say, to "unscrew the inscrutable," will suffice to resolve
the antinomy. The fact is that no one has more suggestively or effectively contributed than the author to the fund of ideas that inspired the
recent realist movement in American jurisprudence. From this point
of view, his gradual recession from that commanding position, by virtue
of increasing insistence upon authoritative traditional principles and
techniques as the primarily significant criteria of justice in a changing
world, bears a tragic aspect of schizologic aberration.
In the wake of this personage, we may note in the pageant of
jurisprudence another champion, less like King Canute than Don
Quixote, namely Professor Fuller, who also bears a lance against tjie
realist trend in a series of lectures entitled The Law in Quest of Itself.12
As these lectures have been more than adequately reviewed elsewhere,18
11 POUND, CONTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY

75-76 (1940).
THE LAW IN QuEST OF ITSELF; Being a series of three lectures provided by
the Julius Rosenthal Foundation for General Law, and delivered at the Law School of
Northwestern University at Chicago in April, 1940. By Lon L. Fuller. The Foundation Press, Inc. 1940.
18 In addition to Professor McDougal's vigorous refutation in "Fuller v. The
American Legal Realists: An Intervention," 50 YALE L. J. 827 (1941), the Iowa
Law Review has published two successive reviews of Professor Fuller's lectures, 26
lowA L. REV. 173 (by B. F. Brown) and 166 (by E.W. Patterson) (1940). Further
reviews have appeared in the Boston University, Harvard, Louisiana, St. John's,
Texas, University of Pennsylvania, and Virginia law reviews, as well as in the American
Bar Association Journal, the American Political Science Review, and the Canadian
Bar Review.
12
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brief comment will suffice. After a survey of various systems of legal
positivism, defined as "that direction of legal thought which insists
on drawing a sharp distinction between the law that is and the law that
ought to be," 14 and among which American legal realism is included,
the lectures are chiefly concerned to demonstrate that such theories,
emphasizing the formal and logistic aspects of law, exercise an inhibitive
effect "upon the development of a spontaneous ordering of human relations, in [their] denial of the force which ideas have without reference
to their human sponsorship." 15 On this negative ground, supplemented
by somewhat dire apprehensions as to the fate of society if legal realism is to continue to hold sway, the argument concludes with a plea for
a "natural law" approach to legal problems, tolerating a confusion of
the is and the ought.
The realism to which this assault seems to be directed is a straw
figure, a fictitious realism. In the first place, as the reviewer had occasion to note some time since with reference to a similar assertion of
Morris R. Cohen,16 the classification of American legal realism in the
category of positivism along with Austin,'Kelsen, etc., is so superficial
as to border on the perverse. As the author truly states, the typical
interest of a genuine legal positivist is in logic and form, while the
interest of the legal realists in these aspects of law is in a degree incidental to their interest in the function, operation, and consequences or,
in other words, the substance, of law.
In the second place, the supposition shared by the author with
Pound and Cohen, that the distinction between the "is" and the
"ought" as proposed by certain realists tends to eliminate the normative
essence of law and to inhibit the progressive development of legal
doctrine, rests, it is suggested, upon a misunderstanding as to the significance and function of jurisprudence. The criticism assumes the term
to designate a quasi-judicial activity in which the jurisprudent is envisaged as engaged in the determination of legal problems and the
statement of doctrine with that end in view. The prevalence of this more
or less unconsciously accepted construction is entirely natural, in view
of the facts that it fits the normal and necessary attitude of the judge
or practitioner engaged in the governmental activity of administering
law, and that, under present theories of legal education, the law schools
IN QuEsT oF ITSELF 5 (1940).
Id. IIO.
16
Yntema, "The Rational Basis of Legal Science," 31 CoL. L. REv. 925 at 946,
note 62 (1931).

u FULLER, THE LAw
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are customarily presumed to train lawyers for such activity. On the
other hand, a scientific, or anthropological, examination of the several
factors in the process of government by law, including specifically the
behavior of lawyers and judges, without imagining such inquiry to be
an immediate form of government, is both possible and desirable. This
sense of the term "jurisprudence" is not inappropriate to the realist
point of view. If so understood, the realist distinction between the "is"
and the "ought" becomes a laudable effort to distinguish the attitude
of scientific inquiry from governmental activity and reformist urge.
It neither eliminates the normative essence of law nor precludes investigation of the relations between legal doctrine and social needs.
As the reviewer has stated elsewhere, a simpler solution of this question, which cannot be more fully dealt with here, is to deny the supposed fundamental significance in legal science of the distinction between sein and sollen, to regard it as a matter of degree, attitude, or
formal statement.11 After all, if the "ought" is significant, it "is" and as
such is meat for the realist. But it does not follow that jurisprudence
should always be defined as an "oughty" science, replete with halfcocked platitudes. Or that legal realism divides "is" and "ought" in
the sense supposed by its critics. They do.
II.

A Restatement of Legal Realism

One of the complaints sometimes made about legal realism is that
it has a supposed anti-rational tendency. It may therefore provide the
realists with some ground for amused relief that Professor Fuller has
discovered their egregious difficulty to consist in a positivistic hyperconceptualism, which inhibits an unabashed "spontaneous" ( which is to
say, irresponsible) projection of ideas about law. If, however, this
charge be insufficient to lay the innuendo of anti-rationalism, a complete disposition of the matter may be found in the stimulating consideration of Law as Logic and Experience by Professor Radin, which
is the third series of lectures to be noted.18 As contrasted with the somewhat dismal, if not desperate, atmosphere of the two works just noted,
attributing to the current realistic philosophies an almost grotesque
and sinister political influence, the account given in these lectures of the
parts played by logic and experience in the life of law breathes an air
of vital humanity and harmonious proportion. It is at once sane, urbane,
17
18

Id. 953-955.

LAw AS LoGIC AND EXPERIENCE. (The Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence, Yale
School of Law.) By Max Radin. Yale University Press, 1940.
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judiciously judicentric ( to appropriate Patterson's expression), irritatingly discursive, here and there pedantically incorrigible, more often
incorrigibly pedantic in historic allusion, and withal delightful. Along
its wandering course are a variety of fruitful and, in some respects,
original conceits. The best that a reviewer can do is to isolate a few of
these for the reader's attention.
Having noted that law as logic is necessarily tautological and
that the illusion of movement in the process of legal logic has been
shown by Cardozo to be backwards from conclusion to major premise,
the first lecture emphasizes the significant, because obvious, point that
the experience which is the life of law is "not the experience of lawyers
but of nonlawyers and has of itself no legal content or coloring or
function." 19 Thus, it becomes legal fact so soon, and only so long, as
it is dealt with professionally by lawyers. Legal experience is nonlegal
experience set in motion by lawyers. This penetrating observation leads
to certain further suggestions of considerable interest respecting the
scope and function of law.
First, the law deals typically with marginal situations, recognized
as abnormal, not by the law, but by society itself. The vastly greater
part of human experience is nonlegal, untouched by lawyers. Second,
law has accordingly no exclusive jurisdiction over experience, as the
historic conception of law as commanding what is to be done and prohibiting what is to be left undone suggests. So the author remarks:
"That, one might imagine, is a large order. To do what we
ought to do and leave undone ·what we ought not to do is nearly ·
the whole duty of man. If law does all this, what is the function of
ethics, of religion, of morals, of education?" 20
Third, if the conception of law as command thus errs on the one hand
in exaggerating the sphere of law, it fails on the other hand to account
for a part of that sphere, originally of primary and still of major,
importance, the definition of liberty. Remarking that "the relation of
'ought' and 'ought not'-the duty-right relation-is somewhat less
important than the relation expressed by 'may,'" the author continues:
"That is to say, a description of law, which derives from the
notion that law''regulates' our conduct, errs not only by excess but
almost equally by defect. For purposes of legal discourse, the
part of human experience which the law declines to direct, or to
19
20

Id. 17.
Id. 18.
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attempt to direct, is nonetheless very much its affair. The life of
the law includes as one of its notable elements the sense of being
free from legal direction." 21
Finally, in view of the limited area covered by law, it is futile to
look to law as a significant means to cure the fundamental evils of
society or to advance civilization. If we may transpose the author's
remarks:
"The law is not right reason, nor the means of the good life, nor
the framework of society, nor the foundation of the world, nor the
harmony of the spheres. . .. So far as those are concerned who
think of law in its relation to other social forces, the only active
participation they can have in the process of advancing civilization
is to insist consciously on the opportunities that just men may find
in the technique of legal judgment and neither to belittle the
opportunity nor to impose upon it a moral obligation that will
render it futile." 22
It is not necessary to labor the pertinence of this analysis to the
current controversies concerning legal realism. A second theme is of
scarcely less interest. It is that, the judicial process being for the most
part post mortem, its object is typically to reconstruct experience as the
basis for decision; that the experience brought before the court is necessarily an experience, dead and gone forever, that cannot be resurrected
and can be only imperfectly guessed at; at that the futility of the
attempt to recall the past is obscured in highly artificial logical rules of
evidence, which are really directed to the trial drama; that, in :fine,
in the author's words:
"The task of the court, therefore, to do the impossible thing,
to reconstruct the past, has been performed in the way in which
fallible human beings much addicted to self-deception would be
likely to perform it. We go on pretending that that is what we
should like to do and then proceed to spend our energies in doing
something else, that is, in constructing a wholly imaginary picture
out of what is said and done before our eyes, in which pictu1"e
every element is a generalization of one of the elements actually
present." 28
This argument of the inability of the judicial process to reproduce
21
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accurately the facts which it has to judge, added to the impossibility
of reducing law in its sporadic contacts with life to a system of Euclidean mathematics, leads to a very p'ractical discussion of the role of
compromise in the legal process, or, in other words, of the possibility
and desirability of basing judicial determinations not upon attempted
reconstructions of the past but upon anticipations of what may be advantageous in the future. In this connection, the author adverts to the
use of arbitration and forcefully argues that in various types of cases
the issues of right and wrong are so obscurely balanced or so incalculable as to render it neither feasible nor expedient to judge in terms
of strict justice. His plea for wider recognition and extension in the
administration of justice of the principle of prevention instead of retribution, except where the moral issue is dear, is most persuasive.
Of similar interest and significance is the argument advanced by
the author that, while lawyers are not as a rule equipped to determine
the punishment to be meted out to criminal offenders, this being a
matter for which special training in penology is requisite, they do have
an important duty to perform in the administration of the criminal
law, a duty with which they may be appropriately entrusted, namely,
the task of preventing the punishment of unpunishable persons.
We may leave this interesting and significant contribution to contemporary jurisprudence with two observations. The first is that, as is
largely true of American juristic literature, the preoccupation is with
the judicial process and the determination by that process of private
claims. This limitation appears specifically in the emphasis upon the
law's concern with individual human beings rather than groups and
in the consideration of litigation affecting classes in the community
rather than individuals. Convinced and not without justice that the
judicial process is ill-adapted to deal with such cases, the author somewhat cavalierly dismisses them to the spheres of politics or administration. By such exclusion from law, the broad fields of public law, including the relations between official and citizen, are measurably left
out of consideration, despite the fact that the lawyer has increasingly
to participate in the solution of problems lying in those fields. A second
fringe in the account given of law appears in the final lecture in which
a place in the judicial process, restricted perhaps but nonetheless essential, is asserted for equity, understood as a sense of justice beyond logic
or experience. If this be not a reference to the transcendental as an
element of judicial valuation, it at least admits into the sphere of law
an irrational if appealing moment of intuition. The necessity for this
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admission, stressed by the author, lies in his basic hypotheses, namely,
that logic cannot move forward and that experience is nonreproducible.

III. Realistic Theories of Justice
If the element of justice, realistically considered, is thus made to
appear by Professor Radin as a basic but undefined X in the legal
process, two recent contributions to the literature of legal realism,
which it is now pertinent to note, profess to ascertain its theoretical
nature and content. The first of these is a monograph, especially useful
in that it includes the most complete bibliography of American legal
realism now available, Legal Realism and Justice by E. N. Garlan.24
This study has a primarily philosophical orientation, and its purpose, as
explained by the preface, is to formulate a theory of justice that will
be adequate to modern insights and activities. The theory presented is
constructed upon "the methodological basis provided by a realistic
approach to law," 25 since, as the author states, legal realism is not a
mere juristic sect but most nearly expresses modern attitudes.
Justice, in this theory, is the "entelechy" of law. Its concepts are
pluralistic and multiple, dynamic and changing, hypothetical and not
self-evident, problematic rather than determinative. In other words,
justice is the perennial quest for improvement in law, functioning as a
symbol to represent the need of constant criticism and constant adaptation of law to the changing society that it articulates. It expresses the
eternal motive of legal reform, "the insistence that law is the means to
ends, making achievement, realization, preservation, and constant criticism always relevant to judgment." 26 In sum, justice is defined less by
the ideals that may be sought than by the search for better law.
This thesis, which supposes that a philosophical theory of justice
is in essence a methodology intent on the constant adjustment of law to
the varying patterns of changing society, an assertion of the teleology
of law, is predicated upon extensive examination of various concepts,
ends, or standards by reference to which it has been attempted to define
justice. After a brief resume of the tenets of legal realism and an instructive discussion of the inherently problematic nature of the legal
process, indicating that the determination of what the law is necessarily
requires a selection, out of the multiplicity of possible solutions, of that
24
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which is desirable, and that such selection requires a valuation of competing concrete claims, a succession of formulae, usually deemed primary
in the definition of justice, are reviewed-the appeal to reason, public
policy, due process, impartiality, equality, the sense of justice, peace,
decency, reasonable satisfaction, benevolence, the ethical sense, natural
law. The details of this review, albeit interesting in various respects,
may be left for the reader's perusal of the volume. In general, it suggests the incompleteness, taken individually, and the lack of unity, taken
together, of the concepts analyzed and remarks that, in varying degree,
their indeterminateness and elasticity serve to enlarge the considerations taken into account in adjudication and to justify the adaptation of
law to new needs.
In this analysis, so far as appears, the concern is exclusively with
the judicial process, and the possible bearings of the thesis on the
processes of legislation or administration are not canvassed. It also
suggests a question as to the function of a theory of justice. In this
connection, the author's observations upon Arnold's position with respect to theories of government,27 noted above, are of interest. The
chief objection apparently is that Arnold seems to turn every theoretician in social science into a priest, important only as a producer of
emotive symbols, and to draw "an almost vicious dichotomy" 28 between the projection of ideals and scientific observation. Although, in
this connection, a distinction between hieratic and scientific approaches
is admitted and, at a subsequent point in the discussion, it is stated that
an investigation into normative problems need not itself be normative,
it does not clearly appear whether or not the author opines that scitific observers should also be priests. And ostensibly the theory advanced is intended to provide a "theoretical underpinning for realistic evaluation and reform." 28a The ambiguity may be taken to reflect
the basis for Arnold's criticism of the realist position.
Another e:ffort to construct a theory of law adapted to the cultural
pattern of modern times, but from a sociological rather than solely a
philosophical point of view, is of special interest as suggesting a possible bridge between law and other social sciences. It is outlined in an
essay, The Significance of Function in Legal Theory, 29 which is to form
21

Id. I 5 ff.
Id. 15.
Id.

2s
2sa

29
18 N. Y. UNiv. L. Q. REv. I (1940), also published as Series 2, Number 2
(1941) in Contemporary Law Pamphlets, New York University School of Law. [Since
this review was written, the treatise LAW WrrHoUT FoRCE has been published by
Princeton University.-Ed.]

] URISPRUDENCE ON PARADE

II7I

a part of a projected publication on Law Without Force by the author,
Gerhart Niemeyer. On the grounds that neither scientific positivism
nor normative idealism resolve the essential problem in law, the relation between the "real" and the "ideal," and that external standards of
morality have proved impotent in modern times as a compulsive criterion for value judgments, the author proposes an immanent standard
of legal valuation. Such a standard, corresponding to the dynamic
realism of modern times, it is stated, is to be found in a functional
analysis of social institutions, in the study of human conduct which is
socially relevant, since it has "an inherent functional destination." so
It is pointed out that prior efforts to derive criteria of value from
social reality have failed, since they were predicated upon individualistic or atomistic conceptions of society; therefore, function or the
social end of relationships between individuals is definitely distinguished from private purposes having no necessary social significance.
The thesis thus reached is that such functions, constituting elements
of social structure organized by transpersonal ends as exhibited in the
experience and actual conduct of individuals, determine the immanent
standards of value of a given social order. This conception, reflecting
the views of Hermann Heller,81 is obviously more congruous with
recent sociological theory than the comparable "balancing of interests"
doctrine, originated by Ihering in an epoch of individualistic thinking,
and at the same time suggests that the theory of valuation is to be controlled by examination of specific social relationships. Since it regards
the meaning of factual social experience as determinant of the social
order, it renders transcendental theories of valuation unnecessary. This
is something, but it scarcely goes beyond establishing a perspective.

IV.

Law as Fact

The lectures and essays thus far reviewed ( with the partial exception of Professor Radin's lectures) are concerned distinctively with
theories of judicial valuation or with theories about such theories. In
contrast to this emphasis, a Swedish school of juristic thought, developed during the past generation by Hagerstrom and Lundstedt,
subordinates the questions of judicial valuation in a more comprehensive and indeed ultra-realistic analysis of the legal process. Of this
point of view, a brief, simple and most effective summary is now availso
81
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able in English in the recent work by Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact. 82
As the title may serve to indicate, the purpose of the author is to provide an account of the operation of the legal system in which facts are
treated as facts.
The inquiry in this volume ( whose course can be but sketched in
this review) commences with the question, Why is law binding? The
obligatory force of law, it is pointed out, does not signify the fact that
disagreeable consequences follow nonobservance, nor the feeling that
law is binding ( since it remains binding in the absence of any such
feeling), nor any other observable fact; therefore, it is concluded, the
obligation of law is an imaginary idea in human minds to which nothing
in the external world corresponds. And accordingly, it is indicated that
the notions that law has inherent authority as a normative system, or as
natural law, or as the will of the state, are not scientifically tenable.
What then is law? Law, according to this analysis, consists of independent imperatives setting up patterns of behavior for those whom
the legislators wish to influence. As such, its rules are defined as "ideas
of imaginary actions by people ( e.g., judges) in imaginary situations." 88
The rules are cast in imperative form in order to obtain the desired
effect, but they are independent imperatives, it is asserted, not commands, for the simple reason that nobody commands them, nor are
they created by the state, for the equally simple reason that the state
as a being existing apart from law is an illusion. How then are rules of
law established? This, it is explained, is no mystical matter, but a pure
question of cause and effect on the psychological level; thus, it is stated:
"Everywhere there exists a set of ideas concerning the government of the country, ideas which are conceived as 'binding' and
implicitly obeyed. According to them certain persons are appointed
to wield supreme power as kings, ministers, or members of parliament etc. From this their actual power obtains. The general attitude towards the constitutionplacestheminkey-positions, enabling
them to put pressure on their fellow-citizens and generally to direct
their actions in some respects." 34
The establishment of rules of law is therefore determined by the
appropriate act of the person or body of persons in whom the power
of legislation is vested by the received constitution. It is always a pure
32
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formality, accepted by the community as designating the patterns of
conduct that it assumes to be obligatory.
From this picture of law start corollaries of some interest for legal
analysis. In the first place, legal duties are imaginary; what really
exist are certain feelings of obligation with which the idea of an imaginary bond is associated, a bond which Hagerstrom has plausibly argued
originally derived from primitive magic. 85 Similarly, legal rights must
also be characterized as imaginary, not objective, entities; to demonstrate the conclusion, an incisive analysis is presented to show that the
concept of legal right corresponds to no external facts. It is emphasized, however, that the ideas of right and duty are not therefore
without significance; on the contrary, the circumstance that such ideas
are believed in greatly simplifies the establishment of patterns of conduct by law. The common belief of the people that they are in duty
bound by the rules of law assures obedience, while the accepted ideas
of rights or imaginary powers avoid the necessity of complicated and
cumbrous reference to the infinite variety of possible situations intended to be covered by legislation. As Ihering once brilliantly pointed
out, these concepts are the alphabet of law, perhaps the most significant
contribution of the Roman genius in jurisprudence. The argument of
course has a nominalistic direction, but to dislodge the conclusion it
will be necessary to show what objective reality other than imaginary
ideas legal rights and duties represent.
In certain respects, an even more fundamental corollary of the
analysis is the relation established thereby between law and force. It is
pointed out that, in the name of law, force is constantly being applied
by state officials in every community and that its presence is indispensable to the maintenance of society-without it there would be no safety
of life or limb, no security for the existing economic order. It is also
pointed out that the most significant effects of this organized application of force are indirect and latent: the more effective such application
is, the less resort there is to actual violence and terrorism; its "unbending pressure on millions and millions of people, keeping their actions
within certain bound_aries, ·is of infinitely greater importance for the
community than the immediate effect of the sanctions applied" 86 in
some thousands of instances. In this connection, the psychological basis
of obedience to law is explained primarily by the fear of sanctions, very
35 Hii.GERSTROM, DER ROMJSCHE
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largely suppressed in ,the subconscious, and emphasis is laid upon the
important role of law in the formation of moral standards, suggesting
that the persistent application of force pursuant to law is more significant in the development of morals than vice versa. Finally, since force
cannot be dissociated from law, it is concluded that the practical question can be only how force can best be utilized for common ends; it is
like fire, indispensable but dangerous when not controlled. Two basic
conditions for the desirable organization of force are postulated: first,
force must be monopolized by an organization; second, its use by the
organization must be controlled by rules. The "reign of law" signifies
that these conditions have been appropriately satisfied.
The argument finds tragic illustration in the field of international
law. In this field, it is suggested, sheer necessity has developed a system of rules, not without restraining effect, but the system of sanctions
is so ineffectual and the rights recognized by the rules themselves are
so loosely defined as to constitute an incitement to war. It need scarcely
be added that events since this work was penned have abundantly
exemplified the penetrating validity of the thesis that the life of law
depends upon the monopolization and harnessing of force by the ruling
organization. When these conditions disappear, the existing legal order
is in peril.
V.

Sociology of Law

This review of the pageant of current American jurisprudence must
conclude with an all too brief reference to two distinctive and thoughtful inquiries concerning the possibility of developing a social science
of law. The first of these by N. S. Timasheff 87 proposes to stake out
a pioneer field for scientific investigation, described as the sociology
of law, and offers a substantial exposition of its proposed subject matter,
which is of special value, among other things, on account of the extensive bibliography included and the formidable array of references appended to each chapter. This new science, proposed as a branch of
sociology, is characterized as a nomographic science; it seeks to discover causal-functional uniformities in socio-legal phenomena. In respect of its object, the projected field is defined pursuant to the analysis
of the forms of social coordination adopted, an analysis resulting from
the crossing of two distinctions, on the one hand, between ethical and
37
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nonethical coordination and, on the other hand, between imperative
and nonimperative coordination. There are thus three possible and
practically significant forms of social coordination, (a) the ethical but
nonimperative, as exemplified by custom and morals, (b) the imperative but nonethical, as in the case of despotic government, and ( c) the
ethico-imperative or legal form of social coordination. The subject
matter of the sociology of law is accordingly defined as the determination and coordination of human behavior by the existence of legal
norms. This analysis fixes the structure of the treatise; it divides into
four parts, the first an introductory discussion of the place of law in
sociology, the place of the sociology of law, and the prior history of
the proposed discipline, and the remaining three parts devoted to the
exposition of the three forms of coordination, the ethical, the imperative, and the legal, considered as equilibria and with respect to their
differentiation and change. In addition, in the part relating to law,
consideration is given to the integration of law in culture, the phenomena of legal disequilibrium and disintegration, and the vindication
of law, the last topic being a refutation of various utopian schemes of
thought proposing the abolition of law.
As may be apparent from the foregoing, a wide sweep of particular problems is involved in the subject matter, too wide in fact to be
given appropriate detailed consideration in this connection. This omission, the more regrettable on account of the comprehensive and lucid
organization of the contents, will perhaps seem tolerable in a review
of current jurisprudence, since the work falls specifically into the
realm of sociology rather than law, as indeed the author is at some
pains to justify in the initial discussion of the place of the sociology of
law. Moreover, it does not appear that the legal materials, certainly
not the materials of Anglo-American law, have been intensively covered, so as to offer significant discoveries of detail of interest to jurisprudence. From this point of view, the chief interest of the work is as
an exploration of the possibility of a sociological formulation of external legal data. As such, it adopts a criterion of law, which, in company with recent trends in political theory and the Swedish school of
legal thought epitomized by Olivecrona, stresses in the sphere of law
the element of force or power. At the same time, it limits the sphere
to such social exercise of force as is associated with an ethical groupconviction. This general thesis, which has the distinctive merit of raising
basic issues as to the ground for a sociological study of law, however,
involves certain questions that it is permissible to note without descending to detail.
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The first question is as to the propriety of thus limiting the field
of law for the purposes of sociological investigation. The limitation, to
be sure, is put forward as an hypothesis, and the existence of peripheral cases is recognized. It is stated:
"It is highly probable that the treatment of law as ethicoimperative coordination covers the cases of which most people
think when speaking of law; legal order is constituted by patterns
of conduct enforced by agents of centralized power ( tribunals and
administration) and simultaneously supported by a group-conviction that the corresponding conduct 'ought to be.' There are
peripheral cases: the highest rules of constitutional law and the rules
of international law seem to lack the support of centralized power;
on the other hand, such rules as, for instance, those regulating
traffic on the highways or customary regulations seem to lack
any relation to group conviction." ss
The question raised by this view turns on the significance of the matter
thus excluded from law. In addition to the large body of legal rules,
such as the traffic or customary regulations noted in the passage cited,
which involve considerations of expediency or efficiency rather than
ethics, there is the even more important area to which Professor Radin
has pointed and in which the legal system is concerned not to vindicate
rights but to declare liberties. In short, the question is whether the
omission of items so substantial from the sphere of law does not bias the
proposed definition. In connection with this observation, a second question is suggested by the thesis as exemplified in its application to the
subject matter. Ostensibly, the purpose is to segregate the :field of
ethico-imperative coordination for sociological investigation. However,
in the execution of this purpose, it apparently seemed essential to
consider, equivalently with the legal, the ethical and imperative
forms of coordination, on the ground that the legal form is a subspecies of each of these generic categories. Thus, the author's project
to isolate a specific field for the sociology of law is defeated in its
execution, since it involves examination of all the significant forms of
social control envisaged.
The third and in some respects the most serious question is whether
the enterprize as conceived is not now abortive. It purports to develop
a causal-functional theory of legal phenomena, to construct a postulational analysis of equilibrium, differentiation, and change in law, not
88
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immediately related to investigation of the specific phenomena and at
a point in the development of the comparative legal inquiries basic for
such a theory, that can only be described as primitive. It is of course
entirely possible that, even under these conditions, the projection of
theory may stimulate further and more specific studies, and therefore
such efforts need not be too much discouraged. But there is also the
eminent possibility, under such conditions, that theories so projected
may be quite superficial or irrelevant, even as theories, merely on
account of their inadequate basis. It is of course not pertinent here to
consider the analogous issue from the viewpoint of sociology, though
it may be of interest to remark in passing that, from that viewpoint,
the thesis has been criticized on corresponding grounds as a belated
effort to create a sociological philosophy of law or theory of values. 80
In this connection, the distinction proposed between the sociology of
law and jurisprudence on the ground of their methodological differences is also in issue. This distinction is predicated upon a more general
distinction between nomographic and idiographic science, between general theory and the study of particulars, which, however, appears
equally artificial for reasons corresponding to those indicated. Nevertheless, if the distinction be regarded as not of kind but only as relating
to the degree of reference to specific data, it is not inadmissible. So
conceived, the sociology of law may appropriately be regarded as one
of the possible and more theoretical aspects of legal science.

VI.

Jurisprudence as Social Science

In contrast to this proposal to isolate a field for the sociological
study of law, distinct from jurisprudence, is the analysis of the theory
of legal science just published by Huntington Cairns,4° in which the
integration of jurisprudence with social science is in effect advocated.
It offers an exact, careful, and challenging expose of the methodology
of jurisprudence conceived as a social science, concisely brilliant in
detail, comprehensive in perspective, which reflects the author's wide
acquaintance with the literature of social science and scientific method.
Its thesis conceives of jurisprudence "as the study of human behavior as
a function of disorder." The methodological ideal, the subject matter,
Gurvitch, "Major Problems of the Sociology of Law," 6 J. Soc. PHIL. 197
at 199 (1941).
40 THE THEORY OF LEGAL ScIENCE, By Huntington Cairns. University of North
Carolina Press. 1941.
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and the objective of a jurisprudence so conceived may be most adequately suggested in the author's persuasive summary:
"Thus," he states, "the theory of jurisprudence as a social
science marks off a :field of inquiry which differs radically from
that explored by the major present-day American schools. It differs first in its ideal, which is the ideal of the other social sciences,
namely, the formulation of statements asserting invariant, or almost invariant, relationships among the facts in its specific field
and, in its special case, the organization of such principles into a
coherent system in conjunction with a rational theory of ethics.
Secondly, it is concerned with a different subject matter. Its point
of departure is not law as such, but human behavior as influenced
by, or in relation to, the social factor of disorder. If the attempt
is successful to create a jurisprudence which is in actuality a social
science, it requires little reflection to grasp the importance of that
result. We are living today in a human world which is under
reconstruction. The focal point of human action is shifting; new
claims, new demands, are calling for recognition. Our theory of
law as we know it now is founded upon a view of a society which
is in a rapid state of transformation. It is obvious that the law itself
must be modified to meet the forces of the new society. . .. A
social science jurisprudence aims at revealing to us the consequences of the various courses of action open to us. It aims to
tell us in advance the perils which attend our various programs;
to tell us which is the rational and which the irrational course." 41
To portray the presuppositions and possibilities of jurisprudence thus
regarded as a social science, concise consideration is given to a series of
related topics, including the meaning of social order particularly as
revealed in the appearance of custom, the influence of invention, communication, and social heredity in the formation of law, the current
theories as to disorder and the nature of the inventive process, the application of scientific method in the study of human behavior, the problems involved in the analysis, classification, and alteration of human
behavior, the theories of causality, functional dependence, and equilibrium, available for relating legal phenomena, and :finally the question whether a normative valuation of values in jurisprudence is
desirable at the present time.
The argument throughout is stimulating but far too compact and
comprehensive to be briefly summarized; the most that can be here
essayed is for the reviewer to note certain issues implicit in its course,
41
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for the rest recommending the volume to the reader's more exhaustive
examination. For example, in justifying the principle of disorder as a
vital factor in legal thought to provide "a point of departure for a
systematic interconnection of legal facts," 42 the assertion that social
thought must start from concepts antithetical to the basic ideas of physical science,48 suggests a subordinate difficulty. It seems inherently inconsistent with the position defined in the quotation reproduced in the
preceding paragraph, as more particularly explained in the chapter on
"The Method of Legal Science." H And it also is more or less refuted
by the frequent and e:ffective reference in the course of the argument
on other topics to concepts evolved in the physical sciences.
The burden of the initial chapter, deprecating the current emphasis
in legal research upon improvement of the administration of justice and
leading to the conclusion summarized in the passage quoted above, involves a second query, also of subordinate significance. It would seem,
curiously enough, that the motive for the conception of jurisprudence
advocated, namely, the need to reform the legal system to meet new
needs, which is also the motive of the trend in legal research deprecated, is the basis of the objection thereto. As the reviewer is signalized
in the discussion as an apologist for the viewpoint criticized,45 it should
perhaps be noted that there is no disagreement respecting the importance of taking a liberal rather than a narrow view of the scope of legal
research nor on the undesirability of confusing scientific method with
its motive. Moreover and on the other hand, it is by no means obvious
that a practical objective necessarily prejudices scientific method; indeed the recent development of research in medicine and physical
science indicates that the almost inevitable relations between the direction of scientific investigations and the currently supposed practical
ends are far from disadvantageous, even for the stimulation of highly
theoretical inquiries. The truth of the matter is that it is relatively
impertinent whether the motive of scientific endeavor be "pure" or
sordid; the relevance of the subject matter to the inquiry in hand
and the exact comprehension with which the data are examined, are
what count.
In passing, mere reference can be made to a third source of query,
the extremely subtle argument in the final chapter tending to the conId.
Id.
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clusion that, at least for the time being, it is undesirable in the objective science of law envisaged to include ethics, or, in other words, the
evaluation of legal values. Briefly and without entering at large upon
this highly involved topic, to which allusion has been made previously
in this paper, three remarks may be ventured: first, that, in the existing
jurisprudential climate, the problem of evaluation is too central to be
satisfactorily obviated; second, that a study of human behavior as
affected by legal regulation will inevitably involve in some sense an
evaluation of the values embodied in the system of regulation; and
third, assuming that both law and ethics have a "normative" subject
matter, the possibility of a descriptive-postulational science so cogently
advanced for jurisprudence is equally plausible for the sphere of ethics.
Finally, the principal issue raised by the proposed conception of
jurisprudence as a social science is its contemplated scope. Be it remarked, as the above-quoted passage will indicate, that the proposed
delimitation of jurisprudence is in terms, not of law as such, but of
human behavior as a function of social disorder. The area thus marked
out is more specifically defined in terms of six elements or constant
legal structures universally appearing within the various socially
homogeneous parts of the earth, namely, the regulation of behavior
with respect to individuals, associations subject to legal regulation, the
community, property, promises, and administration or government. 48
Even so defined, this looks much like a claim on behalf of jurisprudence to a roving commission covering the social sciences generally.
For it is not made clear whether the scope of jurisprudence is thereby
described by reference to the regulated human behavior as such or to
human behavior as regulated by law. The first of these constructions
obviously does not afford a feasible basis for delimiting jurisprudence
from other social sciences, since they may all with equal justice be so
described (assuming the definition of disorder taken in the discussion).
So much is in fact conceded with respect to political science, but the
same situation obtains on this construction as respects the other social
sciences. Now it is not meant to assert that the ancient boundaries of
the social sciences should necessarily be observed. Indeed, there is much
force in the consideration, which perhaps may have influenced the position urged, that these boundaries are unnecessarily artificial and, as
Lynd has recently pointed out,47 tend to discourage most-needed types
of social science research. Moreover, it is undeniable that legal science
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has been disproportionately preoccupied with immediate professional
needs and has inadequately responded to prospective social requirements. But acceptance of this viewpoint directly involves the problem
of establishing more advantageous bases for the necessary division of
labor in social science. This is a crucial question of strategy in the effective disposition of research energies, which the alternative under consideration would but serve to complicate. On the other hand, the second
alternative, which may perhaps be in mind, requires further elucidation
of the distinctive criterion of law, whether as found in the employment
of organized force, in the official agencies involved, in the specific
techniques of social control resorted to, in the application of preformulated rules, in the normative character of the precepts applied, or in
some combination of these or other supposedly characteristic features of
law. This second alternative, which suggests that from certain points
of view jurisprudence may be helpfully regarded as an applied science,
by no means precludes cooperation with related disciplines, the utilization of all pertinent data and theories, or a liberal conception of scientific method in law. It is the great merit of this study to have laid
emphasis on the high importance of these possibilities. The more
modest conception of the sphere of jurisprudence in no sense discounts
the desirability of what the author wisely advocates. It proposes merely
that the desired objective is common to the whole university of social
scrence.

